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Specification of the Joy of Giving: Insights From Altruism
Abstract
This paper analyzes the joy of giving bequest motive in which the utility obtained from leaving a bequest
depends only on the size of the bequest. It exploits the fact that this formulation can be interpreted as a
reduced form of an altruistic bequest motive to derive a relation between the value of the altruism parameter
and the value of the joy of giving parameter. Using previous discussions of an a priori range of plausible values
for the altruism parameter we then derive plausible restrictions on the joy of giving parameter. We
demonstrate that this parameter may well be orders of magnitude larger than assumed in the existing
literature.
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 SPECIFICATION OF THE JOY OF GIVING: INSIGHTS FROM ALTRUISM
 Andrew B. Abel and Mark Warshawsky*
 Abstract-This paper analyzes the joy of giving bequest motive
 in which the utility obtained from leaving a bequest depends
 only on the size of the bequest. It exploits the fact that this
 formulation can be interpreted as a reduced form of an altruis-
 tic bequest motive to derive a relation between the value of the
 altruism parameter and the value of the joy of giving parame-
 ter. Using previous discussions of an a priori range of plausible
 values for the altruism parameter we then derive plausible
 restrictions on the joy of giving parameter. We demonstrate
 that this parameter may well be orders of magnitude larger
 than assumed in the existing literature.
 Bequest motives by individual consumers have im-
 portant implications for the behavior of financial
 markets, the macroeconomic impacts of fiscal policies
 and the intergenerational transmission of inequality in
 the distribution of wealth. At least four reasons for the
 existence of bequests have been discussed in the litera-
 ture: (1) bequests may be the unintentional by-product
 of precautionary savings and a stochastic date of death
 in the absence of an annuity market (Abel (1985)); (2)
 the prospect of bequests is used by parents to induce
 children to behave as desired by the parents (Bemheim,
 Shleifer, and Summers (1985)); (3) bequests may arise
 from intergenerational altruism, that is, consumers ob-
 tain utility from their heirs' utility as well as from their
 own consumption (Barro (1974)); and (4) bequests may
 arise from the "joy of giving," that is, consumers leave
 bequests simply because they obtain utility directly
 from the bequest (Yaari (1964)).
 For some theoretical and empirical analyses of the
 issues affected by voluntary intergenerational transfers,
 the reason for the bequest motive is critical. For exam-
 ple, the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem
 and the implied inefficacy of fiscal policy depends cru-
 cially on an altruistic motive rather than a joy of giving
 motive. For many other purposes, however, the reason
 for the bequest motive is not crucial. Many economists
 have used the joy of giving model, either in the belief
 that it captures the true reason for bequests, or more
 likely, because it is a tractable "reduced form" repre-
 sentation of altruistic preferences. This model has been
 used by Yaari (1965), Hakansson (1969), Fischer (1973),
 and Richard (1975) to examine the joint demand for life
 insurance and risky assets; Blinder (1974) included ajoy
 of giving bequest motive among the mechanisms creat-
 ing inequality in the distribution of income and wealth;
 Seidman (1983) analyzed consumption, inheritance,
 wage and capital income taxes in a life cycle growth
 model extended to include joy of giving bequests; and
 Hubbard (1984), Friedman and Warshawsky (1985) and
 Abel (1986) discussed the implications of imperfections
 in private and public annuity markets for savings be-
 havior and capital accumulation in a joy of giving
 framework.
 In most applications of altruism and joy of giving, the
 bequest motive is parameterized by a small number of
 parameters. Economic theory provides substantial guid-
 ance on the admissible, or at least plausible, values of
 the parameters in the simple formulations of the al-
 truism model and these implications have been dis-
 cussed by Drazen (1978) and Weil (1987). However,
 there has evidently been no systematic discussion of the
 range of appropriate parameter values for simple formu-
 lations of the joy of giving model, despite the popularity
 of this formulation in simulation work. Indeed, in dis-
 cussing the appropriate value of the joy of giving
 parameter, Blinder (1974) states that "there is little
 intuition that can be brought to bear here" (p. 95).
 This paper explores the implications of economic
 theory for the appropriate range of parameter values for
 a popular specification of the joy of giving motive. Our
 strategy is to assume that the bequest is actually moti-
 vated by altruism and then to express the parameter of
 a joy of giving bequest motive in terms of the altruism
 parameter. A striking result of this analysis is that the
 joy of giving parameter could be orders of magnitude
 larger than the values that appear in the simulation
 literature (Fischer (1973), Blinder (1974), Seidman
 (1983), Hubbard (1984)). A related finding is that the
 apparently large joy of giving parameters found by
 Friedman and Warshawsky (1985) correspond to a quite
 modest degree of altruism.
 I. A Model of Individual Behavior
 Consider a family in which each consumer lives for L
 periods and in which N periods elapse between the
 birth of successive generations. Suppose that each con-
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 sumer has one child and that bequests from parent to
 child are made at the beginning of the child's life. Let
 IP be the inheritance received by a generation j con-
 sumer at the beginning of his life, let Y' be the present
 value of labor income of the generation j consumer and
 let c/, i = 1,..., L be the consumption of a generation
 j consumer when he is age i. Letting R be the (gross)
 rate of return on wealth, the lifetime budget constraint
 is
 L
 Yj + IP - L R-('-')cl + R-NIJ+l. (1)
 i=l
 It will be convenient to define HJ as the present value
 of the human wealth of the generation j consumer and
 all of his descendents
 00
 HJ = E (R-N)kyJ+k. (2)
 k=O
 Next, let WJ denote the total wealth, human plus
 non-human, as of the beginning of the generation j
 consumer's life,
 WJ = IX + H. (3)
 Finally, let BJ denote the bequest left by a generation
 j consumer and observe that IJ+1 = B1. Therefore,
 equation (3) implies that
 Wi+- = B' + Hi+'. (4)
 Suppose that the utility function is time-separable
 and displays altruism. Let V' denote the utility of the
 generation j consumer and suppose that
 VJ = max{ZEf8l1u(cJ) + fNaVj?1} (5)
 where u' > 0, u" < 0, ,B captures time preference (O <
 ,8 < 1) and a > 0 indicates the strength of the bequest
 motive. The maximization in (5) is subject to (1) and to
 the solvency condition limj , 0 R- N] WJ ? 0.
 In order for the maximand in (5) to be finite, the
 weight on the heir's utility, 8Na, must lie between 0 and
 1. This restriction does not require a to be less than or
 equal to 1. To help interpret the value of a, we will
 define the term "full altruism" to mean that in every
 period in which both the generation j consumer and the
 generation j + 1 consumer are alive, the optimal allo-
 cation of family consumption is for the parent and child
 to have equal consumption (ck?i - CJ/', i = 1,...,
 L - N).1 Under the utility function in (5), full altruism
 corresponds to a = 1.2,3
 If all generations in an infinitely-lived altruistic family
 have the same utility function, then the utility of the
 generation j consumer is a function of the total wealth
 at birth V' = V(Wi). Hence equation (5) may be writ-
 ten as
 V(W') = max{ E i1lu(cj) + ,8NaV(Wj?l)}
 (6)
 Recalling that W"+' = B' + Hi+ 1, equation (6) has the
 appearance of a "joy of giving" bequest motive. Strictly
 speaking, it is not a joy of giving bequest motive be-
 cause the function V( ) cannot be specified indepen-
 dently; it is the solution to a functional equation. Below
 we solve this functional equation and express the
 parameter of the joy of giving specification in terms of
 the altruism parameter a..4
 We begin by characterizing the solution to the maxi-
 mization problem on the right-hand side of (6). The
 first-order conditions are
 u'(c') = (Rf8)'1u'(c/), i = 2,..., L (7a)
 u'(c') = (R1) NaV,(WWj?) - (R18)Nau,(cj?l)
 (7b)
 where the second equality in (7b) follows from the
 envelope theorem. A steady state is characterized by
 cJ = c/+, i= 1,.. ., L and W' = WJ+1. It follows
 from (7b) that a(Rf8)N = 1 in the steady state.
 II. The Implied Weight of the Joy of Giving
 Bequest Motive
 In this section we present the function Vi = V(W')
 under the assumption that u(c) has the isoelastic form
 u(c)= 1 -a[c > ];a0. (8)
 It can be verified that under isoelastic utility, the solu-
 tion to the functional equation in (6) is5
 V( W) *1-a (9a)
 where
 = { F/[1 - RN (aJNRN)/] } (9b)
 and
 L
 r _ E [R(1/a)1131/a]1']. (9c)
 i=l
 1 Meade (1968) defined a similar concept called "perfect
 altruism."
 2 For more general specifications of the utility from one's
 own consumption, there may not exist any value of a for
 which the utility function displays full altruism.
 3 To verify that full altruism corresponds to a = 1, observe
 that for i = 1.., L - N, u'(ck+i) = (Rf)-(N+-1l)uU(cC) =
 ( R)- (' -)au'(ci+1) = au'(cJ+1) where the first and third
 equalities follow from (7a) and the second equality follows
 from (7b) below. Therefore, ck__ = c+ 1 if and only if a = 1.
 4 Blinder (1974, pp. 37-39) also calculates the value of the
 joy of giving parameter implied by altruism but this calculation
 is restricted to the case of full altruism (a = 1).
 5 See Abel and Warshawsky (1987) for details.
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 TABLE 1.-IMPLIED WEIGHTS ON JOY OF GIVING FUNCTION AND
 ASSUMED DEGREE OF ALTRUISM
 B3-1 _1 R a (a = 0.5) (a = 1) (a = 2) (a=4)
 0.04 1.06 0.56 1.14 4.96 100.99 43,076
 0.04 1.04 1.00 1.80 10.49 356.76 412,807
 0.02 1.06 0.32 2.01 7.47 142.29 58,940
 0.02 1.04 0.56 2.86 15.80 524.71 600,161
 0.02 1.02 1.00 4.91 43.70 3,459.06 21,673,136
 0.01 1.06 0.23 2.91 9.57 172.13 69,611
 0.01 1.04 0.42 3.93 20.24 649.94 732,042
 0.01 1.02 0.74 6.38 55.96 4,398.76 27,466,003
 0.01 1.01 1.00 9.84 130.53 22,964.63 710,820,614
 Source: Calculations based on equation (11) with N = 30, L = 60.
 Using equations (4) and (9a, b, c) we rewrite the utility
 function in (6) as
 /L
 V(W') = {ZEll-1(CJ)
 + X(B' + HJ+1)1a} (1-a)
 (10a)
 where
 X = R-N{J[( ,8NRN) - R -N]. (lOb)
 Equation (10a) expresses the utility of the generation
 j consumer as a function of his own consumption cJ,
 i= 1,..., L and the bequest he makes, B'. This equa-
 tion is equivalent to a joy of giving formulation. Treat-
 ing the exogenous human wealth term H ?+1 as a
 parameter, the joy of giving function is a member of the
 HARA class of utility functions. In the absence of
 human wealth (HJ 0), this function has the fre-
 quently-used isoelastic form.
 We have defined X so that, in the absence of human
 capital, it is comparable to the bequest weight b, in
 Fischer (1973). In the steady state, a(R13)N = 1, so that
 (lOb) implies
 X = R-f{ /[1 - RN]} in the steady state.
 (11)
 Table 1 presents the values of X and a corresponding
 to various rates of time preference and steady state
 interest rates. The last four columns of each row reveal
 that X is an increasing function of the coefficient of
 relative risk aversion a. Even when a is as low as 2, the
 value of X can be orders of magnitude larger than the
 values assumed by previous authors. For example, in
 four sets of his simulations, Fischer (1973) used a rate
 of time preference of 0.04 (actually ,B = 0.96), a net
 interest rate of 0.06, and a coefficient of relative risk
 aversion of 2.0. Although he used a time-varying weight
 on the bequest motive, this weight was roughly equal to
 1 (it was between 0.42 and 1.20).6 The first row of table
 1 indicates that for a = 0.5 a value of X around 1 is
 consistent with a = 0.56 but for a = 2, a value of X
 around 100 is required to be consistent with a = 0.56 in
 the steady state.
 III. Estimates of Altruism
 Table 1 shows the implied joy of giving parameter
 consistent with a given degree of altruism. We can also
 address the inverse question: given a time preference
 discount factor fi, a gross rate of return R and a joy of
 giving parameter X, what is the implied value of the
 altruism parameter a? In this section we provide a
 general solution to this question. Then we apply this
 solution to calculate the values of the altruism parame-
 ter implied by the values of the joy of giving parameter
 estimated by Friedman and Warshawsky (1985).
 We begin by observing that in terms of consumer
 behavior, it is marginal utility rather than the utility per
 se which is important. In the altruistic formulation in
 (10a) the marginal utility of leaving a bequest is
 a v'
 -d = X(BJ + H'+1)0. (12)
 Using (4) and the fact that BJ = P1+1, we may rewrite
 (12) as
 av' (BJ) ( (13)
 Now consider a joy of giving bequest motive. Under
 the commonly used isoelastic form X*(BJ)l - f/(1 - a),
 the marginal utility of a bequest is
 a Vi
 dB_ = X*(Bi)0 (14)
 where X* is the weight on the bequest motive. In order
 6 Blinder (1974), Seidman (1983) and Hubbard (1984) as-
 sumed similarly small values for the joy of giving parameter in
 their simulations.
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 to calibrate X* so that the calculated marginal utility in
 (14) would equal the marginal utility in (13), we equate
 the right-hand sides of (13) and (14) to obtain
 A WJ+1
 = R-((Ii+?/WJ+?)F
 - R-N]} (15)
 The second equality in (15) follows from (lOb). The
 adjustment factor (Ij+l/WJ+l)a in (15) depends on
 the bequest BJ. However, since the goal of this adjust-
 ment is merely to choose an appropriate magnitude for
 X* in empirical and simulation work, some proxies for
 IJ+ IWJ+l may be used such as the population aver-
 age ratio of inheritances to total wealth, or a particular
 family's historical average value of this ratio. Note that
 in the presence of human wealth, IJ+1 < WJ + 1 so that
 X* < X where X is given by (lOb). Equivalently, the
 altruism parameter a corresponding to a particular value
 of X* is larger than the a corresponding to the same
 value of X in the model without human wealth. We can,
 using (15), calculate the value of a corresponding to a
 given value of X* as
 a = (fiR) N{R-N
 + ( Ij+llWj+')(R RNxb*)a }
 (16)
 Equation (16) can be used to interpret the joy
 of giving parameters estimated by Friedman and
 Warshawsky (1985). Using empirically observed annuity
 prices and a life cycle model of saving and portfolio
 behavior, they concluded that an intentional bequest
 motive must be present in order to explain the observed
 small degree of participation in annuity markets. They
 also derived the minimum values for the joy of giving
 parameter that would eliminate purchases of individual
 annuities under various assumptions about the gross
 interest rate, R, the proportion of Social Security and
 pensions in the average retired individual's portfolio, S,
 the degree of risk aversion and the degree to which
 annuity prices exceed the actuarially fair prices. Their
 results, which are reproduced in the top panel of table
 2, might explain the failure of most consumers to buy
 annuities as the consequence of apparently strong be-
 quest motives.
 An alternative measure of the strength of the bequest
 motive is the implied value of the altruism parameter a.
 The bottom panel of table 2 reports the calculated
 values of a using (16) with N = 30, L = 60, f8 =
 (1.01)-1 and R = 1.01 and 1.04. Since Social Security
 income is not bequeathable, Social Security wealth is
 appropriately treated as human wealth rather than as a
 tangible asset. For the ratio of tangible property wealth
 to total wealth, IIW, we use 1 - S, where S is the
 share of Social Security and pension wealth in total
 wealth reported in the top panel of table 2. Finally, the
 values of X* are taken from the top panel of table 2.
 The picture which emerges from the bottom panel of
 table 2 is quite different from that in the top panel. In
 all cases the degree of the implied altruism parameter is
 quite small.7 Thus, a weak altruistic bequest motive will
 be sufficient to eliminate the purchase of private annu-
 ities.
 IV. Conclusions
 This note analyzes the joy of giving bequest motive in
 which the utility obtained from leaving a bequest de-
 pends only on the size of the bequest. It exploits the
 fact that this formulation can be interpreted as a re-
 duced form of an altruistic bequest motive to derive a
 relation between the value of the altruism parameter
 and the value of the joy of giving parameter. We dem-
 onstrate that the joy of giving parameter may well be
 orders of magnitude larger than assumed in the existing
 TABLE 2.-ESTIMATES OF BEQUEST MOTIVE PARAMETER X*,
 FROM FRIEDMAN AND WARSHAWSKY (1985)
 S=0.4 S=0.5 S=0.6
 R = 1.01
 a= 2 18 9 4
 a= 3 169 58 18
 a= 4 1488 343 74
 R = 1.04
 a= 2 10 5 3
 a= 3 66 24 7
 a= 4 419 105 22
 IMPLIED VALUES OF ALTRUISM PARAMETER a
 I/W= 0.6 I/W= 0.5 I/W= 0.4
 R = 1.01
 a = 2 0.026 0.019 0.014
 a= 3 0.007 0.005 0.003
 a= 4 0.002 0.001 0.001
 R = 1.04
 a = 2 0.031 0.023 0.022
 a= 3 0.013 0.009 0.005
 a = 4 0.005 0.003 0.002
 Source: Top Panel-Friedman and Warshawsky (1985), table 9; /3=
 (1.01)- 1.
 Bottom Panel-Equation (16) with /? = (1.01)-', N = 30, L = 60,
 X* from Top Panel with I/W = 1 - S.
 7In assessing these small values of a it must be kept in mind
 that the Friedman and Warshawsky calculations produced a
 lower bound on the strength of the bequest motive. Addition-
 ally, the present value of human wealth of future generations
 has been ignored. The bequest motives may, therefore, be
 substantially larger than the implied lower bounds presented in
 table 2.
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 literature. In addition, existing large empirical estimates
 of the joy of giving parameter are shown to be con-
 sistent with a weak altruistic bequest motive.
 Despite its analytic tractability, there has been some
 reluctance to use the joy of giving formulation even in
 analyses where only a generic bequest motive is neces-
 sary. This reluctance may owe to the difficulty of mak-
 ing reasonable assumptions about, and in empirical
 work and simulation models reasonable interpretations
 of, the joy of giving parameter. In removing this dif-
 ficulty, this paper takes an important step in interpret-
 ing empirical work and simulation results that are di-
 rected at understanding actual economic phenomena
 related to bequests.
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 NONPARAMETRIC ANALYSIS IN PARAMETRIC ESTIMATION:
 AN APPLICATION TO TRANSLOG DEMAND SYSTEMS
 Scott W. Bamhart and Gerald A. Whitney*
 Abstract-We examine whether the use of nonparametric anal-
 ysis can provide information that improves the performance of
 the translog utility function. We evaluate the performance of
 the translog by checking to see if parameter estimates are
 consistent with monotonicity and convexity of the indifference
 surfaces at each sample point. We found that the indirect
 translog performs better when applied to data sets found by
 nonparametric analysis to be consistent with utility maximiza-
 tion. The performance of the direct translog was generally
 poor.
 I. Introduction
 A fundamental problem associated with empirical
 demand studies is the concept of the Hicks representa-
 tive consumer and utility maximization (Phlips (1983)).
 In other words, can the data be rationalized by any
 well-behaved utility function?' Swofford and Whitney
 Received for publication April 27, 1987. Revision accepted
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 'Earlier demand studies used functional forms which satisfied
 the theoretical restrictions implied by the theory of demand
 but were themselves highly restrictive. For example, the linear
 expenditure system meets all theoretical restrictions for a sys-
 tem of demand equations but imposes additive utility. For a
 discussion of this and other functional forms for demand
 systems, see Intriligator (1978).
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